Introduction
In game theory and in particular in the theory of stochastic games, we encounter systems of polynomial equalities and inequalities. We start with a few examples.
The first example relates to the minmax value and optimal strategies of a two-person zero-sum game with finitely many strategies. Consider a twoperson zero-sum game represented by a k × m matrix A = (a ij ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The necessary conditions for the variables v, x 1 , . . . , x k and y 1 , . . . , y m to be the minmax value and optimal strategies of player 1 (the maximizer and row player) and player 2, respectively, are given by the following list of polynomial inequalities and equalities in the variables v, x 1 , . . . , x k , y 1 , . . . , y m : The second example concerns the equilibrium strategies and payoffs of an n-person strategic game with finitely many strategies. Consider an nperson game with finite pure strategy sets A i , i = 1, . . . , n, and payoff functions g i : A → R where A = × n i=1 A i . Let X i denote the set of mixed strategies of player i. Each element x i ∈ X i is a list of variables x i (a i ) ∈ R, a i ∈ A i with x i (a i ) ≥ 0 and a i ∈A i x i (a i ) = 1. The necessary conditions for the variables x i ∈ R A i , i = 1, . . . , n, to be a strategic equilibrium with corresponding payoffs v i ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , n, are given by the following list of polynomial inequalities and equalities: 
where A −i = × j =i A j and for b i ∈ A i and a −i = (a j ) j =i ∈ A −i , (a −i , b i ) is the element of A whose i-th coordinate is b i and whose j-th coordinate, j = i, is a j . The present chapter brings together parts of the theory of polynomial equalities and inequalities used in the theory of stochastic games. The theory can be considered as a theory of polynomial equalities and inequalities over the field of real numbers or the field of real algebraic numbers or more generally over an arbitrary real closed field. Real closed fields are defined in the next section. The reader who is interested in the theory over the field of real numbers R can skip the next section.
Real Closed Fields
The content of this section is part of the theory developed by Artin and Schreier for the positive solution of Hilbert's seventeenth problem: Is every polynomial P ∈ R[X 1 , . . . , X n ] with P (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≥ 0 for every (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n a sum of squares of rational functions? This material can be found in many books, for example [4] .
A real field F is a field F such that for every finite list of elements x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ F with n i=1 x 2 i = 0 we have x i = 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The characteristic of a real field is 0. The field of real numbers R is a real field. Every subfield of a real field is a real field and thus the field of real algebraic numbers R alg and the field of rational numbers Q are real fields. Another example of a real field is the field of rational functions R(X) in the variable X.
A real closed field is a real field F that has no nontrivial real algebraic extension F 1 ⊃ F , F 1 = F . Equivalently, a real closed field is a field F such that the ring
is an algebraically closed field. An important property of a real closed field F is that every polynomial of odd degree P in F [X] has a root in F .
An ordered field (F, ≤) is a field F together with a total order relation ≤ satisfying: The classic examples of ordered fields are the field of rational numbers Q, the field of real numbers R and the field of real algebraic numbers R alg with the natural order (x ≤ y ⇔ 0 ≤ y − x).
We next describe an order on the field R(X) of rational functions of X. If P (X) = n i=k a i X i where 0 ≤ k ≤ n are nonnegative integers and a k = 0 then P (X) > 0 if and only if a k > 0, and
Q(X) > 0 if and only if P (X)Q(X) > 0. An equivalent definition of this ordering is obtained by realizing that each rational function P (X)/Q(X) defines a real-valued function x → P (x)/Q(x) on any sufficiently small right neighborhood of 0 and then P (X)/Q(X) > 0 if and only if for all sufficiently small values of
Every sum of squares in an ordered field (F, ≤) is a positive element. Not every positive element in an ordered field (F, ≤) is a sum of squares. However, if F is a real closed field, for every x ∈ F , either x is a square in F or −x is a square in F . Therefore, there is a unique total order ≤ on a real closed field F so that (F, ≤) is an ordered field; this unique order is defined by x ≤ y if and only if y − x is a square.
Puiseux Series
We now turn to describe a field that plays an important role in the theory of stochastic games: the field of real Puiseux series. A Puiseux series (over a field F ) is a formal expression f of the form
where a i ∈ F and M is a positive integer. In other words, a Puiseux series is a formal Laurent series in fractional powers of X. Two Puiseux series f = b j X j/N we can assume without loss of generality that N = M and k = , and with that assumption on the representation of f and g, the sum f + g is defined as the formal
, and the product of f and g is defined as the formal Abel product of the series, i.e., as the Puiseux series 
It is known that C(X) ∧ is algebraically closed ( [7] , p.98). Of particular importance are the subfields, C(X) c∧ , C c∧ alg , R(X) c∧ and R alg (X) c∧ of C(X) ∧ , consisting of all convergent Puiseux series, i.e., all series
and a i ∈ R alg respectively), such that for all sufficiently small real numbers x > 0, the series ∞ i=k |a i |x i/M converges. The fields C(X) c∧ and C alg (X) c∧ are algebraically closed.
Semialgebraic Sets and Functions
Throughout the remainder of this chapter R is a fixed real closed field. The reader that is interested in the theory over the field of real numbers R can replace in all the definitions and results below the real closed field R with R.
A subset V of R n is a semialgebraic set if V belongs to the smallest Boolean ring of subsets (i.e., closed under complements, finite union and finite intersections) of R n which contains the sets
Note that the inequality ≥ in the above definition can be replaced with any one of the following inequalities: ≤, > or <. Indeed, the set {x
, is the intersection of the two semialgebraic sets {x = (
, and thus it is semialgebraic. An equivalent definition of a semialgebraic set is: 
where for every i = 1, . . . , k and every j = 1, . . . , r,
i (x) = 0. Therefore, another equivalent definition of a semialgebraic set is:
Definition 2 A subset V of R n is called semialgebraic if it is the finite union of sets of the form {x ∈ R n : P 0 (x) = 0 and
where for every
We will later see (as a result of the Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem (Theorem 1 below)) that if ϕ : V → U ⊂ R n is semialgebraic so is the set V . Therefore, an equivalent definition of a semialgebraic function is the one that requires in addition that the domain V be semialgebraic. A simple corollary of the above definitions is
Proof. We prove the result for the case R = R. The extension of the result to an arbitrary real closed field needs a minor modification to the argument below that uses open sets in R k+n , e.g., by defining properly Euclidean open sets in R n . The graph of ϕ is the union of finitely many nonempty sets G i , i ∈ K (where K is a finite set), of the form
As ϕ is a function, its graph does not contain an open set, and therefore each one of the polynomials f i is not identically zero, and thus the polynomial
Remarks. The following are immediate corollaries of the definition of semialgebraic sets.
is a semialgebraic subset of R k . − Any semialgebraic subset of R is either empty or a finite union of intervals. Equivalently, the semialgebraic subsets of R are exactly the finite unions of points and open intervals (bounded or unbounded).
EXAMPLES OF SEMIALGEBRAIC SETS
E.1 For each fixed x ∈ R n and r > 0 the ball of radius r and center x, {y ∈ R n :
For a fixed finite set K we denote by ∆(K) the simplex of probabilities on K, i.e., the subset of R K given by {x ∈ R K : ∀k ∈ K, x k ≥ 0, and k∈K x k = 1}, and if K = {1, . . . , n} we denote ∆(K) by ∆ n . We now turn to game-theoretic examples of semialgebraic sets.
GAME-THEORETIC EXAMPLES OF SEMIALGEBRAIC SETS
E.3 For any fixed list of real numbers a ij , i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m, the optimal strategies and value of the two-person zero-sum game (a ij ),
For any fixed positive integers, n and m, the graph of the correspondence that maps each n×m two-person zero-sum game to the set of optimal strategies and value, i.e., the set {(a,
E.5 Similarly, for any positive integers n, m 1 , . . . , m n , the graph of the equilibrium correspondence that maps each n-person game in which player i has m i pure strategies to the set of equilibrium strategies and corresponding payoffs is a semialgebraic subset of R n
EXAMPLES OF SEMIALGEBRAIC SETS IN STOCHASTIC GAMES
E.6 The value and optimal strategies correspondence of zero-sum two-person stochastic games. Consider the family of all two-person zero-sum stochastic games with a fixed finite state space S, and fixed finite action sets: for every player i = 1, 2 and every state z ∈ S the set of actions of player i at state z ∈ S is a finite set A i (z). We denote by A(z) the cartesian products A 1 (z) × A 2 (z). The family of all two-person zerosum stochastic games with the fixed state space S, and the fixed action sets A(z), z ∈ S, is parameterized by the list of payoffs (to player 1) r(z, a) ∈ R, (z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z)), and the list of transition probabilities p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S), (z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z)). A stationary strategy of player i is represented by a list of vectors
is a semialgebraic subset of
The above set is the set of all two-person zero-sum stochastic games with the fixed set of states S, discount factors λ, and all corresponding unnormalized value payoffs V z (z ∈ S) with corresponding stationary optimal strategies x i z ∈ ∆(A i (z)) (of the discounted stochastic games with payoff functions described by the real numbers r(z, a), z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z), and transitions described by the vectors p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S)) and discount factor λ. Similarly for fixed payoffs r(z, a), z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z), and fixed transitions p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S), z ∈ N and a ∈ A(z), the set of all vectors (λ, x i z , V z ) satisfying the polynomial inequalities and equalities 1), 2), 5), 6), and 7), is a semialgebraic set; it is the graph of the correspondence that maps each discount factor λ to the unnormalized value payoffs V z (z ∈ S) with the corresponding stationary optimal strategies x i z ∈ ∆(A i (z)) of the discounted stochastic games with discount factor λ with payoff functions described by the real numbers r(z, a), z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z), and transitions described by the vectors p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S). E.7 The equilibrium correspondence of n-person stochastic games. Consider the family of all stochastic games with a fixed finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a fixed finite state space S, and fixed finite action sets: for every player i ∈ N and every state z ∈ S the set of actions of player i ∈ N at state z ∈ S is a finite set A i (z). We denote by A(z) and A −i (z) the cartesian products × j∈N A j (z) and × j∈N,j =i A j (z) respectively. The family of all stochastic games with the fixed set of players N , the fixed state space S, and the fixed action sets A(z), z ∈ S, is parameterized by the list of payoffs r i (z, a) ∈ R, (i ∈ N , z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z)), and the list of transition probabilities p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S), (z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z)). A stationary strategy of player i is represented by a list of vectors x i z ∈ ∆(A i (z)), z ∈ S. Then the set of all vectors (λ,
The above set is the set of all stochastic games with the fixed players and state sets N and S respectively, discount factors λ, and all corresponding unnormalized equilibrium payoffs V i z (i ∈ N and z ∈ S) with corresponding stationary equilibrium strategies x i z ∈ ∆(A i (z)) (of the discounted stochastic games with discount factor λ, with payoff functions described by the real numbers r i (z, a), z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z), and transitions described by the vectors p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S)). Similarly for fixed payoffs r i (z, a), i ∈ N , z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z), and fixed transitions p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S), z ∈ N and a ∈ A(z), the set of all vectors (λ, x i z , V i z ) satisfying the polynomial inequalities and equalities 1), 2*), 5*), 6*), and 7*), is a semialgebraic set; it is the graph of the correspondence that maps the discount factors λ to all unnormalized equilibrium payoffs V i z (i ∈ N and z ∈ S) with the corresponding stationary equilibrium strategies x i z ∈ ∆(A i (z)) of the discounted stochastic games with discount factor λ, with payoff functions described by the real numbers r i (z, a), z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z), and transitions described by the vectors p(z, a) ∈ ∆(S).
The Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem
In this section we state the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem. In a later section we will state a general structure theorem for semialgebraic sets from which the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem will follow.
The following is a statement of the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem in a geometric form.
Theorem 1 Let V ⊂ R n+m be a semialgebraic set, and let π : R n+m → R n be the natural projection on the first n coordinates; i.e., π(
Notice that the natural projection on the first n coordinates of a subset V ⊂ R n+m is the set {x ∈ R n | ∃y ∈ R m s.t. (x, y) ∈ V }. Therefore, an equivalent statement of the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem asserts that for every semialgebraic set V ⊂ R n+m , the set {x ∈ R n | ∃y ∈ R m s.t. (x, y) ∈ V } is semialgebraic. Similarly, the set {x ∈ R n | ∀y ∈ R m (x, y) ∈ V } is the complement of {x ∈ R n | ∃y ∈ R m s.t. (x, y) ∈ V c } (where V c denotes the complement of V ) and thus it is semialgebraic. We now state a corollary of the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem which extends the above observation to an arbitrary number of universal quantifiers. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. For k = 2, the set {x 1 ∈ V 1 | ∃x 2 ∈ V 2 s.t. (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ V } is the projection on the first m 1 coordinates of the set V ∩ V 1 × V 2 , and the complement in V 1 of the set {x 1 ∈ V 1 | ∀x 2 ∈ V 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ V } is the projection on the first m 1 coordinates of the semialgebraic set V c ∩ V 1 × V 2 . Therefore, if k = 2, the set V Q is semialgebraic. Assume that k > 2. By the induction hypothesis the set
is semialgebraic, and
and thus V Q is semialgebraic.
Applications of the Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem
A useful property of continuous semialgebraic functions ϕ : (0, r) → R is stated in the next proposition. A more detailed property of semialgebraic functions ϕ : (0, r) → R is stated later.
Proposition 1 Let ϕ : (0, r) → R be a continuous semialgebraic function. Then there exists 0 < θ < r such that ϕ is monotonic on (0, θ).
Proof. By Corollary 1, there is f ∈ R[X, Y ] with f = 0 and f (x, ϕ(x)) = 0 for every x ∈ (0, r). In case that the degree of the polynomial f with respect to the variable X, deg X f is 0, the function ϕ is a constant. We prove the proposition by induction on deg
For every choice of signs = ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} 2 , the set
is semialgebraic and ∪ A = (0, r). As every semialgebraic subset of R is the union of finitely many open intervals and finitely many points, there is and 0 < θ < r such that A ⊃ (0, θ). In case that either 1 or 2 equals 0, the monotonicity of ϕ follows from the induction hypothesis. As the functions ∂f ∂X and ∂f ∂Y are continuous on R 2 and the function ϕ is continuous on (0, θ), the function ϕ is monotonic decreasing on (0, θ) whenever 1 2 > 0 and it is monotonic increasing whenever 1 2 < 0.
The above monotonicity (in a sufficiently small right neighborhood of 0) of a semialgebraic function ϕ : (0, r) → R holds also for an arbitrary real closed field R, and moreover, the continuity assumption is not needed. However, when the field is either R or R alg , the result is derived also from the following more detailed property of a real semialgebraic (or real algebraic) function: elements f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ F , k ≤ n, and positive integers n 1 , . . . , n k such that
and thus for every x > 0 sufficiently small (so that P n (x) = 0 and all the series defined by
Let r > 0 be sufficiently small so that for all 0 < x < r the series defined by f i (x), i = 1, . . . , k, converge and f i (x) = f j (x) whenever 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, P n (x) = 0, and the function ϕ is continuous on (0, r). It follows that on the interval (0, r) the function ϕ coincides with one of the functions x → f i (x), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. As ϕ is real-valued all the coefficients of the Puiseux series f i are necessarily real. Moreover, if
is a root of Q and all coefficients of Q are polynomials in R alg [X] , it follows by induction on j − k that a j ∈ R alg .
We now state an important implication of the above results to twoperson zero-sum stochastic games: Proof. Let G be the graph of f . As f is semialgebraic, G is a semialgebraic subset of R n+m . Note that f (X) coincides with π(G) where π : R n × R m → R m is the natural projection of R n × R m to R m and X coincides with the natural projection of G on R n .
Theorem 3 (Bewley and Kohlberg [2]) For any two-player zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many states and actions, the functions
λ → v λ , v λ = (v λ (z)) z∈S ,
Corollary 4 The composition of semialgebraic functions is a semialgebraic function.
Proof. Assume X ⊂ R n , and ϕ : X → Y ⊂ R m and ψ : Y → Z ⊂ R k are semialgebraic. Therefore the set {(x, y, z) ∈ R n+m+k | x ∈ X, y = ϕ(x) and z = ψ(y)} is the intersection of two semialgebraic sets and thus it is semialgebraic. Its projection on R n × R k is the graph of the composition ψ • ϕ and by the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem it is semialgebraic.
Proof. The graph of the function f + g is the projection on the first k + n coordinates of the semialgebraic set {(v, x, y, z 
The graph of the function hf is the projection on the first k + n coordinates of the semialgebraic set
The next corollary deals with the closure and interior of a semialgebraic set V ⊂ R n where the closure and interior are with respect to the Euclidean topology on R n which extends the classical Euclidean topology on R n .
The Euclidean norm of an element
The Euclidean topology on R n is defined as the topology for which the open balls, {y ∈ R n | y − x < r} where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n and 0 < r ∈ R, form a basis of open subsets. Continuity of R n -valued semialgebraic functions is defined as continuous functions with respect to the Euclidean topology. In other words, using the ε, δ language, we observe that a semialgebraic function ϕ : V → R n , where V ⊂ R k is continuous at x ∈ V if for every 0 < ε in R there is 0 < δ in R such that for every y ∈ V with y − x < δ, ϕ(y) − ϕ(x) < ε.
Corollary 6 Let V be a semialgebraic set in R n . Then the closureV of V , its interior and its frontier are semialgebraic sets.
Proof. Note that as the family of semialgebraic sets is closed under complementation and finite intersection, it is sufficient to prove that the closure of a semialgebraic set is semialgebraic. Set U = {(x, r, y) ∈ R n+1+n : x − y 2 < r 2 }. The set U is semialgebraic andV = {x ∈ R n : ∀r > 0 ∃y ∈ V s.t. (x, r, y) ∈ U }. Thus by Corollary 2,V is semialgebraic.
We continue with a less classic application of the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem. The functions defined in the lemma below use the infimum (largest lower bound) and supremum (smallest upper bound) of semialgebraic sets. A bounded set of a real closed field need not have a least upper bound. However, as every semialgebraic subset V of a real closed field R is the finite union of open intervals and single points, every semialgebraic subset V of a real closed field F that is bounded from above (bounded from below) has a least upper bound (a largest lower bound).
Lemma 1 Let V be a nonempty semialgebraic subset of R n+m+k , and assume that f : V → R is a bounded semialgebraic function. Let V 1 (z), z in the image of the natural projection of V on the last k coordinates, denote the semialgebraic set of all elements x ∈ R n for which there is y ∈ R m with (x, y, z) ∈ V . Then,
and z → sup
are R-valued semialgebraic functions defined on the natural projection of V on R k . z) ), and let g :
The graph of the function v is the following semialgebraic set:
The next theorem asserts that given a semialgebraic nonempty-valued correspondence Γ, it is always possible to select a semialgebraic function f whose graph is a subset of the graph of Γ.
Theorem 4 Let X ⊂ R n × R m be a semialgebraic set, and let π be the natural projection of R n × R m onto R n . Then there is a semialgebraic function f : π(X) → R m whose graph is a subset of X.
Proof. We first provide a simple proof for the special case where R = R and π −1 (x) := {y ∈ R m | (x, y) ∈ X} is compact for every x ∈ π(X). This special case is often used in applications to stochastic games. Define inductively the decreasing sequence of semialgebraic sets X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X m by
and that X m is the graph of a function f : π(X) → R m . The proof of the general case uses the structure theorem that is stated in the last section and is by induction on m. For m = 1 it follows from the structure theorem. Indeed, the structure theorem asserts that there is a partition of R n into finitely many (connected) semialgebraic sets, T , such that for any A ∈ T there is a nonnegative integer s A and (continuous) semialgebraic functions
Assume the result is true for m and let
is a semialgebraic subset of R n × R m and by the induction hypothesis there are semialgebraic functions f 1 : π 1 (π 2 (X)) → R m and f 2 : π 2 (X) → R whose graphs are subsets of π 2 (X) and X respectively. The function f : π(X) → R m × R defined by f (y) = (f 1 (y), f 2 (y, f 1 (y))) is semialgebraic and its graph is a subset of X.
We now state an application of the algebraic tools -the semialgebraic selection theorem (Theorem 4) and Theorem 1 -to the λ-discounted equilibrium correspondence. If λ = (λ i ) i∈N is a profile of discount rates, a λ-discounted equilibrium is a profile of strategies σ such that for every player i and every strategy τ i of player i we have
where
Every λ-discounted game with a profile of discount rates λ has an equilibrium in stationary strategies. 
Minmax and Maxmin in Stochastic Games
We start with the introduction of constrained stochastic games. Assume that in addition to the ordinary description of a stochastic game we have for every state z and player i a subset X i (z) of the mixed actions in state z of player i. We study the stochastic game in which player i is restricted to behavioral strategies σ i such that for every history (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z n ), the mixed action σ i (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z n ) is in X i (z). Such a strategy is called a (X i (z)) z∈S -constrained strategy, or a X i -constrained strategy for short. Consider a twoperson constrained stochastic game. We say that v λ is the maxmin of the λ-discounted constrained stochastic game if for every ε > 0, 1) there is a X 1 -constrained strategy σ of player 1 such that for every X 2 -constrained strategy τ of player 2 and every initial state z 1
where r n = r(z n , a n ), and 2) for every X 1 -constrained strategy σ of player 1 there is a X 2 -constrained strategy τ of player 2 such that for every initial state z 1
Let Φ be the map Φ :
where for x ∈ ∆(A 1 (z)) and y ∈ ∆(A 2 (z)), r(z, x, y) and p(z | z, x, y) are the multilinear extensions of r and p respectively, i.e.,
and therefore w λ is the maxmin value of player 1 in the two-player constrained λ-discounted stochastic games. Similarly, define the map Ψ :
The map v → Ψ(λ, v) has a unique fixed pointw λ which is the minmax value of the constrained stochastic game, i.e., for every ε > 0, 1) there is a X 2 -constrained strategy τ of player 2 such that for every X 1 -constrained strategy σ of player 1 and every initial state z 1
and 2) for every X 2 -constrained strategy τ of player 2 there is a X 1 -constrained strategy σ of player 1 such that for every initial state z 1
Therefore the minmax of the λ-discounted constrained stochastic game,v λ , exists and equalsw λ . If the constrained sets X i (z) are semialgebraic, so are the maps Φ and Ψ, and therefore the maps λ → w λ and λ →w λ are semialgebraic. Moreover, for every ε > 0 there is a semialgebraic function mapping a discount factor λ to a (X i (z)) z∈S -constrained stationary strategy σ λ such that for every (X 2 (z)) z∈S -constrained strategy τ of player 2, E σ λ ,τ ( respectively, where the max is over all strategies σ i of player i and the min is over all N \ {i} tuples of strategies σ −i of the other players, and r i n is the payoff r i (z n , a n ) to player i at stage n as a function of the state z n and action profile a n at stage n. These maxmin and minmax of player i are the maxmin and minmax of a two-person zero-sum constrained stochastic game: player 1, the maximizer, is player i with a constrained set X 1 (z) = ∆(A i (z)), and player 2, the minimizer, is the set of players N \ {i} with a constrained set X 2 (z) = × j =i ∆ (A j (z) ). Thus, a special case of Theorem 6 is: 
A Structure Theorem
We here state a structure theorem for semialgebraic sets (see [1] for the case R = R). 
